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My Life, My Story, Right? Fashioning
Life Story Rights in the Motion
Picture Industry
by
MICHELLE E. LENTZNER*
Introduction
Can someone own your life story before you have finished living it?
This quandary confronted Christine Costner Sizemore, the subject of the
1957 film, The Three Faces of Eve. The movie depicted a woman suffer-
ing from a multiple personality disorder. Christine Costner Sizemore
contracted with Twentieth Century-Fox for the use of her life story as
the basis for the film. Now, more than thirty years later, she has recov-
ered from her multiple personality disorder and wishes to sell the movie
rights to her third biography, describing events occurring almost entirely
after the period of her life covered in The Three Faces of Eve. Twentieth
Century-Fox maintains that a 1956 Assignment and Consent form pro-
hibits her from selling these rights.' Thus, complex questions arise, for
producers and subjects alike, concerning whether public policy will en-
able a subject,2 such as Sizemore, to argue that a sale of life story rights
covers only the period of life up to the time of the assignment.
* B.A., Economics, with Distinction in General Scholarship, University of California,
Berkeley, (1988); Member, Second Year Class, University of California, Hastings College of
the Law. The author thanks her family and friends Katie Wine, David Shemano, Reed
Heimbecher, and Ken Kwartler for their help and encouragement.
1. At the time of this writing, Christine Costner Sizemore is engaged in settlement nego-
tiations with Twentieth Century-Fox regarding rights she assigned to Fox in 1956 for the use
of her life story in, The Three Faces of Eve. For a more detailed outline of this particular case,
see Rudell, The Three Faces of Eve: Granting Life Story Rights, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 28, 1989, at 3,
col. 1. The questions raised by such sales can usually be handled with carefully drafted con-
tracts. At least one attorney recommends that "competent, experienced entertainment special-
ists" be called upon to negotiate life story deals. Golden, Docudramas Raise Thorny Legal
Issues, N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1987, at 19, col. 5. The dilemma facing non-specialists is that the
selling of life stories is not a well-settled field of law. Very few cases have addressed life story
rights, and the published cases do not create a consistent doctrine, since they are based to a
large extent on different state statutes and varying recognitions of privacy and publicity rights.
Id. at 5, col. 2.
2. "Subject" will be used throughout this Note to refer to someone whose life story may
be of interest to the movie industry or to someone who wishes to exploit her life story.
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First, a producer must decide whether to purchase rights to a life
story. If the producer decides to negotiate with a subject for such rights,
exclusivity may be figured into the purchase price. The attraction of
movies-of-the-week, recounting recent "hot" news items, such as a
trapped toddler's rescue, a kidnapper's capture, or a mother's fight to
protect her child from sexual abuse,3 generates large advertising revenues
for the networks. A portion of these revenues, however, does not neces-
sarily filter down to the subject. Rather, the public interest that makes
the story valuable may also qualify it as within the public domain, elimi-
nating much of a producer's incentive to obtain permission from the sub-
ject to tell her story.
If movie making is examined not as an artistic endeavor, but instead
as primarily a money-making industry, it seems incredible that the per-
son whose life inspires the movie receives comparatively little of its reve-
nues. Whatever amount is apportioned to subjects may also be split up
among several parties, diluting the main subject's share.
Celebrities or public officials who exploit their personas have the
power to pursue lawsuits against producers who appropriate their life
stories, though they face the obstacle of having largely relinquished their
privacy to the public.5 A private person suddenly spotlighted by the me-
dia, however, rarely has the money or expertise to protect her life story
from exploitation by others. If any payment is received for the use of her
life story, it may be limited to an option payment for the initial right to
develop the life story.6 These life story payments may range anywhere
from a few thousand dollars to hundreds of thousands of dollars.7
The disparity in payments reflects the disparity in treatment sur-
rounding the purchase of life story rights. When creating movies incor-
3. Everybody's Baby: The Rescue of Jessica McClure (ABC television broadcast, May 21,
1989), I Know My First Name is Steven (NBC television broadcast, May 22 & 23, 1989), and In
the Best Interests of the Child (CBS television broadcast, May 20, 1990), respectively. The
term "life story" is used by entertainment attorneys to refer to a person's actual experiences
from which a "deal" may be fashioned to produce a movie or book. For other examples of life
story movies, see Pilgrim, Docudramas and False-Light Invasion of Privacy, 10 CoM. AND THE
LAW 3, 21 (June 1988).
4. Telephone interview with Patricia Clifford, an independent film producer whose com-
pany produced the film about Jessica McClure (Mar. 28, 1990). The exact amounts paid to life
story subjects are often confidential, although the $150,000 figure estimated by some entertain-
ment lawyers may be too high. Generally, deals are made through agents representing the
subjects. Id.
5. See Note, Television Docudramas and the Right of Publicity: Too Bad Liz, That's Show
Biz, 8 COMM/ENT L.J. 257 (1986) (authored by Lisa A. Lawrence).
6. Golden, supra note 1, at 19, col. 5.
7. Golden, The Business of Movies for TV- What Practitioners Should Know, N.Y.L.J.,
May 29, 1987, at 5, col. 6.
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porating fiction with fact, the entertainment industry must consider
several legal issues:
* Will a studio be subject to libel or invasion of privacy suits by
people whose lives are depicted?
a How accurate and how reflective of public interest will the movie
be so that a fair use of what is in the public domain may be claimed?
* Does the subject own underlying property rights in her life
story?
* Will the subject be competing with the movie studio through an-
other production or publication of her story?
* Can the studio prevent the subject from competing with its use
of the subject's life story?
The answers to these questions vary according to jurisdictions and
to facts. When deciding whether to purchase a life story, the producer
may compare the subject's ability to hinder the studio's efforts, either
through a lawsuit or competition, with her ability and willingness to cre-
atively assist in the production. If the producer decides to purchase a life
story, she will probably draft a contract limiting the subject's control. If
the producer decides against a purchase, the subject's success in suing the
studio for invasion of privacy or for the misappropriation of a personal
property right in her life is subject to the jurisdictional laws of the sub-
ject's domicile and the newsworthiness accorded her life by the court.
If a subject sells her life story to a producer, she then faces the chal-
lenge of drafting a properly protective contract. The dispute between
Twentieth Century-Fox and Sizemore, regarding ownership of the movie
rights to her third biography, highlights one of the problems parties face
when drafting contracts for life story rights: the duration of the contract
term. Sizemore's dispute also provokes several intriguing questions
about the extent to which a life story may be sold.
This Note will examine the recourse, if any, a subject has in receiv-
ing compensation for the use of her life story depending on whether a
contract exists. This Note will also examine an average person whose life
story has gained a "brief moment's notoriety."' This person's rights, un-
like those of a celebrity, are most often overlooked, as she may have
neither the financial means nor the legal sophistication to pursue an af-
ter-the-fact lawsuit.9 After a brief discussion regarding the basics of
purchasing a life story, the Note will evaluate three theories regarding a
subject's rights: copyright, invasion of privacy, and the right of publicity.
8. Golden, supra note 1, at 5, col. 3.
9. "Most of the living people shown in docudramas are impoverished or people of mod-
est means who cannot afford to finance a lawsuit." Id.
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Background
Life stories on film date back to early newsreels around the turn of
the twentieth century.'" Real people and actual situations were recreated
for posterity, to instruct, inform, entertain, or dramatize. The word
"docudrama"" is derived from the documenting of actual occurrences
and the dramatization of them through creative reenactment. The genre
of docudramas is sometimes termed the "fictionalization of factual mate-
rial,"12 or "faction." 1
3
People depicted in these films were not necessarily flattered by the
publicity. In the 1913 case of Binns v. Vitagraph, 14 the first person to use
the telegraph to save people in an emergency sued Vitagraph for its unau-
thorized portrayal of him. A New York court, relying on New York
Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51,1 5 decided that although truthful
10. Pilgrim, supra note 3, at 3.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 4.
13. Brooks, The Maze of Docudrama: Issues to Consider When Dramatizing Factual Mate-
rial, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 19, 1985, at 4, col. 1.
14. 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913).
15. The current statutes are essentially identical to the ones cited in Binns. N.Y. Civ.
RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1989): "A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising
purposes or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person with-
out having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent
or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor."
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1990):
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for advertising
purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent first obtained as
above provided may maintain an equitable action in the supreme court of this state
against the person, firm or corporation so using his name, portrait or picture, to
prevent and restrain the use thereof, and may also sue and recover damages for any
injuries sustained by reason of such use and if the defendant shall have knowingly
used such person's name, portrait or picture in such manner as is forbidden or de-
clared to be unlawful by section fifty of this article, the jury, in its discretion, may
award exemplary damages. But nothing contained in this article shall be so con-
strued as to prevent any person, firm or corporation from selling or otherwise trans-
ferring any material containing such name, portrait or picture in whatever medium
to any user of such name, portrait or picture or to any third party for sale or transfer
directly or indirectly to such a user, for use in a manner lawful under this article;
nothing contained in this article shall be so construed as to prevent any person, firm
or corporation, practicing the profession of photography, from exhibiting in or about
his or its establishment specimens of the work of such establishment, unless the same
is continued by such person, firm or corporation after written notice objecting thereto
has been given by the person portrayed; and nothing contained in this article shall be
so construed as to prevent any person, firm, or corporation from using the name,
portrait, or picture of any manufacturer or dealer in connection with the goods,
wares and merchandise manufactured, produced or dealt in by him which he has sold
or disposed of with such name, portrait or picture used in connection therewith; or
from using the name, portrait or picture of any author, composer or artist in connec-
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 12:627
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recountings of actual events are not prohibited, Vitagraph's pictures of
Binns were manufactured, not genuine. Even with manufactured pic-
tures, Vitagraph still could have prevailed if it had been able to convince
the court that the film had instructional value. Such value may be an
affirmative defense, shielding defendants from false-light invasion of pri-
vacy claims. The court, however, found both that the portrayal was in-
accurate and that the defendant's main purpose was to "amuse those
who paid to be entertained." 6 Binns won, primarily because the court
feared a denial of recovery would encourage future incursions into all
matters of private life by exhibitors seeking to profit by the amusement
created at others' expense.
Binns illustrates one of the claims a subject may have against produ-
cers who use her life story without her consent: the false-light invasion
of privacy through fictionalization. The success of this claim, however,
depends on a number of factors including the newsworthiness of the
events depicted, the actual use of the subject's name, and the accuracy of
the portrayal.
Three scenarios may arise from the creation of "faction-based"
films. First, the movies may be heavily "fiction-disguised," so that the
movie bears little resemblance to actual persons, living or dead, yet the
subject claims she is depicted in the fiction. Second, the movie may be
heavily "fact-disguised," so that the movie resembles dramatized non-
fiction through its seemingly objective presentation. Finally, the movies
may be "fact-disclosed," so that the subject is identified with the dramati-
zation of the non-fiction elements.17 If the subject wishes to pursue a
claim against the producer for unauthorized use of her life story, she will
face the most difficulty if the movie falls into one of the first two catego-
ries, because she must prove that she truly is the subject. At common
law, a subject who has not contracted with the producer for use of her
life story faces a first amendment hurdle if she tries to pursue claims of
defamation, invasion of privacy, misappropriation of property rights, or
prima facie tort. 8 This is why one entertainment attorney suggests that
a subject contact a lawyer soon after she has gained notoriety, if she
wants to protect the use of her story. 9
tion with his literary, musical or artistic productions which he has sold or disposed of
with such name, portrait or picture used in connection therewith.
16. Binns, 210 N.Y. at 58, 103 N.E. at 1111.
17. Baer, When Movies are Made About Real People, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 21, 1983, at 5, col. 3.
18. Several attorneys have addressed the possible claims a subject may have, without go-
ing into depth about the relative strengths and weaknesses of these claims. See generally id.;
Golden, supra note 1, at 5, col. 1. See also Brooks, The Maze of Docudramas: Issues to Consider
When Dramatizing Factual Material, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 19, 1985, at 4, col. 1.
19. Golden, supra note 1, at 19, col. 5.
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II
Purchasing a Life Story
A. The Option Contract
A producer of a docudrama needs to consider the possibility that his
subjects will claim invasion of privacy, false light depiction, or appropria-
tion. 20 Notwithstanding the relative merits of these claims, it may be
cheaper for a studio or producer to obtain rights to a subject's life story
for a reasonable sum than to risk a lawsuit.21 An exclusive right to use a
person's life story may also include special access into the subject's life,
distinguishing that production from any other production.
The option contract allows the producer to secure exclusive rights to
the subject's life story,22 while he investigates the probability of creating
a successful movie based on the life story. The producer must have some
reason for thinking that the life story will attract viewers. Timing is cru-
cial. The fact that a subject is currently front page news does not guaran-
tee viewer attraction months later.23 Timing should also be a subject's
concern, lest declining interest cools the popularity of the life story, thus
lowering her asking price.24
Lawyers should be involved on both the producer's side and the sub-
ject's side at this stage, because some option contracts' terms may have
far-reaching impact on any future contracts the subject makes. The dan-
ger of failing to employ lawyers skilled in this unique area can be seen in
the problems facing Christine Costner Sizemore. A dispute regarding the
lack of an express time limit in the 1956 assignment of rights is presently
at the center of negotiations between Sizemore and Twentieth Century-
Fox. The dispute is over the correct interpretation of who may legally
exercise exclusive movie option rights to her life story.25
1. Elements of the Option Contract
The duration of the option is generally the first issue covered. The
producer will want the longest period possible to exercise the option to
buy the life story rights. In contrast, the subject will want to limit this
20. Renee Wayne Golden, a Los Angeles entertainment lawyer, wrote, "[i]n docudramas,
the most frequent problems are public disclosure and appropriation, although there have been
claims of false light privacy and appropriation." Id. at 5, col. 2.
21. Brooks, supra note 18, at 4, col. 1.
22. For an excellent discussion of the practical aspects of drafting an option contract, see
Williams & Frascott, The Lawyer's Role in the Acquisition and Exploitation of Life Story
Rights, 31 BOSTON B.J., July/Aug. 1987, at 9.
23. Golden, The Business of Movies for TV- What Practitioners Should Know, N.Y.L.J.,
May 29, 1987, at 6, col 4.
24. Id.
25. See discussion supra note 1.
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period, since a long decision period for the producer inhibits the subject's
ability to maximize the topical economic value of selling rights while her
story is "hot." It is advisable to limit the option period to six to twelve
months, with options to renew for an additional price.26 The subject also
should be wary of any future restrictions on her ability to sell her life
story, in case the producer buys her rights and then does not make a
movie within a specified period of time following his exercise of the
option.
Other elements of the option contract include the option price, pay-
able upon execution of the option agreement. Generally, ten percent of
the minimum purchase price for the life story rights is agreed upon, but
this may vary according to the producer's available budget and the pub-
lic's awareness of the subject.27 The ultimate purchase price for the sub-
ject's life story may range from just a few thousand dollars to a few
hundred thousand dollars.28
2. Grant of Rights to the Producer
The grant of rights to the producer for the making of a movie is
another major element of the option contract. In order to comply with
various network standards (framed out of fear of defamation suits), the
producer will want the subject to grant to him a
perpetual, exclusive, and irrevocable right, throughout the universe, to
depict the subject, whether wholly or partially factually or fictionally,
and to use the subject's name, likeness, voice, and biography, in any
and all media and by any and all means whether now known or hereaf-
ter developed and in all advertising and exploitation thereof.29
The producer also will desire the "right to portray, impersonate, and
simulate the subject in any way in which the producer in his sole discre-
tion may determine." 3 The producer's reason for obtaining such over-
whelming discretion is that his financial risk is at stake. Nevertheless,
the subject may want to keep some supervisorial power, perhaps by get-
ting final approval rights regarding the script and/or actors chosen. The
subject's limitation of the producer's discretion and her corresponding
attempts to obtain more control for herself would reflect the concern that
her personal integrity is at stake. Joint supervisorial power may create
problems when differences in opinion between the subject and
moviemakers occur. These conflicts may make both production and
26. William & Frascott, supra note 22.
27. Id. at 10.
28. Golden, supra note 24, at 5, col. 6.
29. Wiliams & Frascott, supra note 22, at 10.
30. Id.
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marketing next to impossible,31 and should likewise be considered care-
fully by the producer during contract negotiations.
3. The Subject's Representations and Warranties
The producer may also need to secure a representation from the sub-
ject that the subject has all
rights and authority necessary to enter into an exclusive option and
purchase agreement... free and clear of any encumbrances, claims,
etc.; that the consent of no other person, entity, court, or other judicial
authority is necessary for the subject to enter into and fully perform
the option agreement; [and that] the subject has not nor will make any
grants, assignments, or agreements that will or might conflict or inter-
fere with the rights granted to producer under the option agreement;
and that producer's use of the right will not infringe upon or violate
the rights of any person or entity, including defamation, libel, slander,
or violation of any right of privacy or publicity. 3
2
With the preceding warranty and representation clauses, the subject
should be especially careful to limit the producer to specific information
given. Ultimately, the producer may draft a condition precedent to his
payment of the purchase price for the life story upon the subject's pro-
curement of written releases from people who are part of the life story.33
In this way, the producer may protect himself from defamation, privacy,
and publicity claims. 34 In order to avoid violating the condition prece-
dent to her receipt of the purchase price, the subject should only promise
to exercise her best efforts in obtaining such releases.35
Another matter the subject may want to cover in the option contract
is the establishment of her own rights to publish or market spin-off prod-
ucts based on her life story, notwithstanding the producer's theatrical
production. The producer may want a percentage of the profits from
such products by the subject's other contracts on the theory that his
movie enhances these products' market value.36
B. The Contract
Contracting with a studio or producer to sell the life story may be
the best way for the subject to secure some of the revenues generated by
her inspiring story. The subject should be advised against submitting her
rendition of her life story to a producer without contractual coverage
31. Id.
32. Id. at 11.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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regarding disclosure. In Walker v. Time-Life Films, Inc.," a police of-
ficer who chronicled his experiences patrolling New York's 41st precinct
submitted his manuscript to a scriptwriter without any express agree-
ment regarding disclosure. Later, upset by cinematic depictions of him,
the police officer sued the makers of the movie Fort Apache for its simi-
larity to his book. The court dismissed a number of the police officer's
claims, including his breach of confidentiality claim, stating that mere
submission of his manuscript was not sufficient to constitute a confiden-
tial relationship.3" A subject wanting to forestall summary judgment
against her should negotiate a contract detailing the scope of her consent
to the producer's use of her life story.
1. The Studio's Viewpoint
A studio may not want to tie itself down to contracting for life story
rights, if it thinks it may freely use the story due to its existence in the
public domain. Nonetheless, the studio or producer may desire a con-
tract to ensure against possible claims of invasion of privacy or defama-
tion. The producer may want the subject's exclusive cooperation in
order to create a uniquely accurate movie. Conversely, the studio may
desire some leeway in fictionalizing a subject. The subject's contracted
cooperation may help or hinder the producer's job, depending on the
degree of control the subject ultimately wields. The American Broad-
casting Company (ABC), like other television networks, has established
broadcast standards for the production of docudramas.39 These stan-
dards require the producer to document the sources relied upon for de-
pictions of any actual people in the script. ABC's guidelines focus on
avoiding misrepresentation of actual events and people.' If the producer
has the subject's cooperation, obtaining necessary information and re-
leases may be easier. On the other hand, difficulties may arise if the sub-
ject is given too much control over the creation of the movie and objects
frequently to the director's artistic decisions. The trick is to balance the
subject's concerns about integrity with the producer's goal of making a
profitable movie.
The contract itself is not the equilibrating tool; the terms are. In
Sliwa v. Highgate Pictures,4 for example, Curtis Sliwa, founder of the
Guardian Angels, sold an option to and then contracted with Highgate
37. 615 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
38. Id. at 440. But see discussion regarding implied-in-fact contracts, infra (III)(C).
39. AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANY, DEPARTMENT OF BROADCASTING STAN-
DARDS AND PRACTICE, DOCUDRAMA PROGRAMMING GUIDELINES (rev'd ed. 1988) [hereinaf-
ter AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANY GUIDELINES].
40. Id.
41. 7 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1386 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981).
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Pictures for the production of a television motion picture.42 Part of the
contract granted Highgate the right to depict Sliwa's story in a "fictional-
ized account or a factual manner."43 When Sliwa later sued the com-
pany for irreparable harm by its fictionalized depiction of him, Highgate
was found not liable. The court interpreted "or" to mean alternative
choices existed, giving Highgate leeway in its fictionalization. The twist
on the New York Supreme Court's decision is that even without the con-
tract, Highgate could have created a story around Sliwa, had they only
done so in general terms. Since the company was admittedly fictional-
izing the Guardian Angels' story, they could depart from reality as de-
sired, as long as they followed an outline based on actual facts in order to
deliver the essence of the story. Permission to fictionalize, after all, is
permission to depart from reality. Relying on the first amendment, the
court stated that a writer has great latitude in telling a story, provided
that there is no reckless disregard for the truth which would lead to ac-
tual damage to the subject. 44 A contract supersedes first amendment
rights, however, and binds a writer to agreements made. Thus, the fact
that Highgate chose to contract with Sliwa actually did restrain them
somewhat, but not enough for Sliwa to recover on an irreparable harm
claim.45 Of course, a contract also binds the subject to claims falling
within the contract terms, which may explain why studios seek to utilize
them.
Another benefit the studio receives upon contracting with the sub-
ject is the ability to extend the dramatic aspect of a docudrama without
concern about a false light invasion of privacy lawsuit. Sliwa's contract
referred to a future television series or a motion picture. The contract
gave Highgate Pictures exclusive rights to fictionalize Sliwa's story, as
distinguished from a contract solely to produce a documentary. 46 The
court suggested that, due to the contract, Sliwa had the burden of prov-
ing irreparable harm, in addition to establishing any contract violations
before the court would find in his favor.47 Sliwa believed the producers
portrayed his story (as opposed to himself) in a disrespectful manner.
The New York court discussed at length the difficulty of deciding if the
essence of a story is maintained when it is fictionalized. In reviewing the
plaintiff's claim, the court found that the movie's essence was to promote
the value in volunteerism, and to this end the movie succeeded.48 The
42. Id. at 1387.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1388.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1389.
47. Id. at 1392.
48. Id. at 1389.
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Sliwa court recommended revising the movie's disclaimer to clearly indi-
cate that Sliwa's life "inspired" the movie, and that the movie was a
dramatized account of the group he organized, the Guardian Angels.49
Just as a contract may establish the level of accuracy required when
depicting the subject's life story, it can also establish who has controlling
rights over the film's production. Sometimes the movie studio contracts
with the writer who publicized the life story. Such a contract was agreed
to before the production of the 1982 movie Missing, which traced the
disappearance of United States citizen Charles Horman in Chile.50 Since
the author assigned to Universal City Studios, Inc. "exclusive, absolute,
and unlimited" discretion in adapting his work, the court excused the
author from any possible libel suits resulting from the film.5
2. The Subject's Viewpoint
If the subject sells her life story to a writer, she should draft the
contract to cover the possibility of the writer's later assignment of his
rights to a movie studio. She may want to require that the biographer
provide his services on a "work-for-hire" basis. 2 This arrangement
would give her sole and exclusive property rights in her story as appro-
priate under the Copyright Act.53 If the "work for hire" provision is not
used, a writer may assign the rights to a motion picture studio.54
When contracting with a producer, the extent to which the sale of
the subject's life story prevents utilization of other marketing ventures
49. Id. at 1392.
50. Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 580 F. Supp. 1082 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
51. Id. at 1097-98.
52. The "work made for hire" doctrine is a compromise between the authorship rights
granted through copyright and the shop rights granted through patent law. The purpose of
the doctrine is to give the commissioning employer more control over the employee's product.
The "work made for hire" doctrine, codified in 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1988), states that:
In the case of a "work made for hire," the employer or other person for whom the
work was prepared is considered the author for the purposes of this title, and, unless
the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them,
owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.
Additionally, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) defines work made for hire as follows:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or
(2) a work specially commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as
part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supple-
mentary work, as a compilation .... if the parties expressly agree in a written
instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for
hire.
See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989); McNamara, Pre-
serving the Creator's Right of Authorship to Works Made for Hire, Ent. and Sports Law.,
Spring/Summer 1989, at 15.
53. Williams & Frascott, supra note 22, at 11-12.
54. DeSalvo v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 300 F. Supp. 742, 745 (D. Mass.
1969).
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should be considered. For example, if the subject sells her life story to a
producer in 1989, is she prevented from writing an autobiography in
1990? Will the contract cover only events of her life up to the time of the
contract? Can she sell her story again in 2000 to cover events in her life
since 1989? Subsequent transactions depend on the terms and exclusivi-
ties of the first contract. If the producer bargains for life-long exclusiv-
ity,55 this should be reflected in the purchase price. The producer then
will be able to enjoin any other sale by the subject as a breach of contract.
The ethical question remains: Is selling such an eternal option valid
at all, when the future events of the subject's life are so unpredictable?
Of course, contracting to receive something in the future involves an ele-
ment of risk-taking. Thus, such an option probably will not be invalid as
a matter of law.
Notwithstanding ethical considerations, the subject should explicitly
define the contract's duration. This may involve acknowledging an ex-
tension or termination of the contract, contingent upon the occurrence of
certain conditions. According to the court's decision in Fayard v. Henry
Holt & Co.,56 however, omission of such issues is not necessarily disas-
trous for the subject. Fayard retells the development of publishing agree-
ments between Lech Walesa and two publishers, the first with Henry
Holt & Co., for Walesa's autobiography. Walesa and Holt had an agree-
ment granting Holt exclusive publishing rights to Walesa's autobiogra-
phy. Walesa failed to furnish Holt with a manuscript within the
contract's specified time period. Later, Walesa agreed to write his auto-
biography for Fayard. Holt protested this second agreement and argued
that its prior exclusive agreement with Walesa was still binding. The
court ruled that Holt could not unilaterally extend its rights to Walesa's
story without an express contractual provision. Walesa's failure to meet
his time obligations did not give the publishing company the ability to
extend indefinitely its exclusive rights to his story.
A contract should expressly provide a producer with time exten-
sions based on the occurrence of some condition precedent. Absent this
proyision, if a problem arises preventing the original agreement from rip-
ening, a subject then would be free to negotiate with other producers. A
life story contract should delineate the period of the subject's life being
55. "Exclusive" rights, as used here, refers to the producer's sole right to use the subject's
life story. Life-long exclusivity means no one else during the subject's life may produce a
theatrical depiction of the life story.
56. 726 F. Supp. 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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sold. This may include delimiting the date upon which the life story
commences and ends. 5
7
3. Merchandising Rights in Life Story Contracts
Merchandising rights may also be a key issue in life story contracts.
Suppose the producer wants to market a product fashioned along the
subject's image, such as a doll. Is that an infringement of the life story
contract? Courts have analogized to a copyright derivative rights case to
explain this problem. In Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co.,"8 the
radio network contracted with comedian Ed Wynn to produce a weekly
radio show which the company would sponsor in order to advertise itself.
The show was so popular that Wynn decided to publish his scripts and
sell them as pamphlets called "Uproar." 59 The show's sponsor objected
on the basis that these pamphlets would interfere with the advertising
value of their broadcasts.' Since no assignment had been made to the
sponsor, the court agreed that the property in the radio scripts belonged
to Wynn as the writer. The court stated, however, that this property
right was restricted. 6 Wynn was "not at liberty to make any other use of
[the scripts] which would in any way weaken or interfere with that for
which they had, so to speak, been sold."62 The court relied on the re-
quirement of good faith and fair dealing to hold that the writer could not
take unfair advantage of the popularity of the defendant's advertised pro-
gram in seeking to sell the scripts originally written for the defendant's
use. The court agreed with the defendant that the sale of the pamphlets
could "cheapen" the value of the radio show and could lead to public
confusion regarding the origin of the published material.63 Thus, when
drafting a contract for a movie, a subject needs to consider the limita-
tions that may be placed on future exploitation of her life story in other
media.
4. Obstacles in Drafting Life Story Rights Contracts
As mentioned earlier, the appropriate timing of a life story contract
depends on the circumstances surrounding the story's popularity. Some
states frown upon defense lawyers drafting life story contracts for their
57. Telephone interview with Renee Wayne Golden (Mar. 26, 1990). An example would
be limiting the scope of a movie about a prisoner to the period covering her crime and her
rehabilitation in prison, terminating at the time she is released from prison.
58. 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 670 (1936).
59. Id. at 375.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 376.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 377.
clients during the period their clients are involved in a criminal trial."
The states' concern is that the lawyer's effective representation may be
compromised because the attorney, in an attempt to boost the asking
price for the life story sale, may sensationalize the trial.6" If the subject is
currently a convicted criminal, special statutes may prescribe who re-
ceives the proceeds from the sale of the criminal's life story.66
A contract also may be improper when the subject has already con-
tracted away her life story rights through a previous sale or a covenant
not to disclose. Special government agents may be burdened with this
obstacle, as illustrated in Snepp v. United States.67 Snepp, upon becom-
ing a CIA agent, had agreed that he would "not ... publish . . . any
information or material relating to the Agency, its activities or intelli-
gence activities generally, either during or after the term of [his] employ-
ment . . . without specific prior approval by the Agency. ' 68 Snepp
breached this agreement when he drew upon his personal experiences to
publish a book about CIA activity in South Vietnam without giving the
CIA an opportunity to see his manuscript beforehand. The court de-
cided to impose a constructive trust to require Snepp to disgorge the pro-
ceeds from his "faithlessness." '69 Prior contractual arrangements,
therefore, may override a life story contract.
64. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(d) (1989) ("Prior to the con-
clusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving
the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part on infor-
mation relating to the representation"). But see Maxwell v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 606, 63
P.2d 248, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1982) (If client is able to barter for the rights to his story, lawyer
should not be at risk for resulting transaction and should not be subjected to discipline for it).
65. United States v. Hearst, 466 F. Supp. 1068, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 1978). Hearst tried to
have the judgment vacated on the theory that her attorney, F. Lee Bailey, failed to render
effective assistance of counsel. She claimed a conflict of interest arose out of his alleged plans
to publish her story. The district court, however, criticized Hearst for trying to use her broad
claims of conflict of interest to insulate much of her trial testimony. (Hearst complained that
Bailey's demand that she take the stand was motivated by Bailey's desire for increased public
attention in order to increase the selling value of her life story.) The court decided that Hearst
insufficiently supported her claim of colorable prejudice: "Distasteful as the practice may be,
however, it is not the case that the mere existence of a publications rights contract renders the
representation constitutionally deficient." Id. Citing Model Code of Professional Responsibility
DR 5-104(B) (1980), which condemns defense counsel for acquiring literary or dramatic rights
prior to the conclusion of representation, the court said Hearst did not show actual prejudice
had resulted from the alleged conflict as was shown in People v. Corona, 80 Cal. App. 3d 684,
145 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1978). In Corona, the publicity rights contract was found improper, since
defense counsel was shown to have committed gross errors of law in order to increase the
publicity value of the trial. Id.
66. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 2224.1 (West 1989), which establishes an involuntary
trust fund for those having a right of recovery against the felon who sells his story.
67. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
68. Id. at 508.
69. Id. at 515.
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C. The Possibility of Finding an Implied Contract
The advantage of finding an implied-in-fact contract is that the sub-
ject does not need to establish property rights in her life story.7 ° An
implied-in-fact contract is based on the idea that a promise was implied
from the parties' conduct of mutual assent and consideration.71 If the
subject and producer discuss movie possibilities, but no contract is ever
drawn, the subject may nevertheless have a claim for payment against the
producer. She must establish that her expectation of forthcoming com-
pensation led her to divulge facts about her life to the producer. As long
as the parties' conduct evidences an exchange of benefits, an implied-in-
fact contract can be found. 72
The court in Desny v. Wilder,73 involving a lawsuit between a writer
and a television producer, examined the facts to see if an implied-in-fact
contract existed. The court considered whether the disclosure of an idea
was based on a promise to be paid for the service of disclosure, or was
based on the value of the idea itself. If the disclosure was based on the
promise of compensation, the subject could invoke California Civil Code
Section 1606: "An existing legal obligation resting upon the promisor, or
a moral obligation originating in some benefit conferred upon the prom-
isor, or prejudice suffered by the promisee, is also a good consideration
for a promise, to an extent corresponding with the extent of the obliga-
tion, but no further or otherwise." 74
In California, the problem in construing an implied-in-fact contract
may be traced to California Civil Code Section 1605:
Any benefit conferred, or agreed to be conferred upon the promisor, by
any other person, to which the promisor is not lawfully entitled, or any
prejudice suffered, or agreed to be suffered, by such person, other than
such as he is at the time of consent lawfully bound to suffer, as an
inducement to the promisor, is a good consideration for a promise. 75
Thus, as a defense to the subject's claim of an implied-in-fact contract,
the producer may argue he is lawfully entitled to the subject's life story
through the doctrine of fair use, if the life story is already within the
public domain.76 This creates a paradox for the subject, since the value
70. Chandler v. Roach, 156 Cal. App. 2d 435, 319 P.2d 776 (1957).
71. A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 18, at 25-27 (1952).
72. See generally Chandler, 156 Cal. App. 2d 435, 319 P.2d 776 (the court dispensed with
a television writer's need to establish that the ideas he claimed a producer had taken were
novel and definitely of the writer's own inspiration, as long as an exchange of benefits was
apparent).
73. 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956).
74. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1606 (West 1989).
75. Id. § 1605 (emphasis added).
76. See discussion infra (IV)(B), regarding fair use.
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of the life story is usually derived from its recognition in the public
domain.
Any evidence of a communication of the confidentiality involved in
the subject's submission of her story to the producer may help, neverthe-
less, to substantiate the subject's claim of an implied-in-fact contract.
Without such evidence, the subject's claim may be dismissed, just as a
creative game-show enthusiast's was in Faris v. Enberg.77 Faris devel-
oped a new idea for a sports quiz show and told it to a television sports
announcer. Unfortunately, Faris did not expressly demand that the an-
nouncer refrain from sharing his idea with others. When the sports quiz
show was subsequently created without Faris' help, the court decided
that the issue of whether such an idea was copyrightable was not a neces-
sary element of proof.78 The court instead decided that an actionable
breach of confidence could be sued upon, as long as the
idea, whether or not protectable, is offered to another in confidence,
and is voluntarily received by the offeree in confidence with the under-
standing that is not to be disclosed to others, and is not to be used by
the offeree for purposes beyond the limits of the confidence without the
offeror's permission.
Faris was unable to show a confidential relationship, and therefore lost
on a summary judgment motion.
III
Copyright Protection
A. Will a Copyright Argument Clarify the Protection Owed to a Life
Story?
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power to "pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive [r]ight to their respective
Writings and Discoveries. "80 The Copyright Act8 limits the scope of
copyrights to tangible methods of expression and original works of au-
thorship. Although literary works and motion pictures are considered
works of authorship, life stories which have not been recorded in any
fashion are not. Perhaps the reason for the distinction is that literary
works need copyright protection in order to enable authors to earn a
living proliferating them, but life stories will not decrease in number even
77. 97 Cal. App. 3d 309, 158 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1979).
78. Id. at 323, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 712. This decision may help in the area of life story
protection because life stories are not copyrightable unless reduced to tangible forms of expres-
sion. See discussion, infra Part III.
79. Id.
80. U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
81. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
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if they are not protected from exploitation. One purpose of copyright
law is to reward creative efforts, thus stimulating artistic creativity for
the public good. 2 Life story facts are not created, they simply happen.
Unless they are set down in some form, it is doubtful that they will meet
the recognized foundations necessary for copyright protection.
1. Ideas are Not Copyrightable
Even if it is argued that life stories provide inspiration for other
work, the second part of 17 U.S.C. section 102(b) denies this as grounds
for copyright protection: "In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, sys-
tem, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of
the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in
such work."8 3 Therefore, this provision precludes mere ideas from copy-
right protection. If the subject's life story has somehow been captured in
a tangible form such as a biography or interview, however, the subject
may be permitted to protest a producer's unconsented use of her life
story.
2. Arrangements of Facts May be Copyrightable
When reduced to a writing, the life story may meet the minimum
standards for copyright protection by manifesting intellectual labor in a
tangible form. 4 Intellectual labor, however, may not be enough. In
Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc. ,"3 the author of the book 83 Hours
Till Dawn was unable to recover against a studio's use of his book in
making a television movie. The court found that absent a contract with
the author, the studio could use facts freely. Although the writer may
have discovered facts, he could not claim them as his own. The intent of
17 U.S.C. section 102(b) is to promote the development of ideas into
forms of expression by keeping the ideas free for anyone's use.86 There-
fore, granting an infringement claim in this case would have been akin to
granting a copyright in research. The Fifth Circuit feared this would
allow facts to be claimed as property, thereby making facts copyright-
able. If facts could be copyrighted, then so could ideas. This clearly
went against the intent of 17 U.S.C. section 102(b). The Court of Ap-
peals limited its interpretation of copyright protection as extending to the
form of expression, arrangement, and selection of facts.8 7
82. M. NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A], at 1-31 to 1-32 (1988).
83. '17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
84. M. NIMMER, supra note 82 § 1.08[C], at 1-48 to 1-49 (1988).
85. 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981).
86. Id. at 1368.
87. Id.
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Holding that the arrangement of facts may be copyrightable does
not necessarily aid a subject in seeking protection for her life story. As
exemplified by Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,8 the scope of
copyright protection in such instances is narrow. Hoehling wrote an ac-
count of the Hindenburg disaster, in which he posited sabotage as the
cause. Ten years later, another author published a book which also re-
counted the Hindenburg disaster. The second author incorporated
Hoehling's theory of sabotage, although in a different form. Universal
paid for film rights to the latter book, and Hoehling sued for infringe-
ment. The essence of the similarities between Hoehling's book and the
second author's came from Hoehling's theory of sabotage. The court de-
cided that Hoeling's theory was an idea and as such was not
copyrightable. 9
The Second Circuit drew from Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Ran-
dom House, Inc.,9° in which use of copyrighted biographical writings
about Howard Hughes was allowed in order to promote public knowl-
edge. The Hoehling court reasoned that interpretation of an historical
event was not copyrightable as a matter of law.91 In this manner, the
court refused to limit use of historical research to one person as a copy-
right theory might so limit.92 A subject whose life story might be
deemed beneficial for public knowledge may find these rulings trouble-
some. The subject may believe the rulings grant too much freedom to
others to investigate her life on the pretext of historical research.
The Hoehling court's deference toward historical research stems
from its underlying argument against copyrighting facts. Facts belong to
everyone, and just because someone "discovers" them does not imply
that the facts originated with that person.93 "Thus, since facts do not
owe their origin to any individual, they may not be copyrighted and are
88. 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980).
89. Id. at 979.
90. 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966). Rosemont copyrighted its articles about Howard
Hughes, which were published in Look magazine in 1954. When Random House sought to use
these articles in a biography about Hughes in 1966, Rosemont sued for injunctive relief. The
Second Circuit decided that to allow the copyright claims would frustrate use of facts about
Hughes. Refusing to allow Random House to incorporate items from the Look articles would
go against the very reason for copyrights, the promotion of knowledge. Regardless of any
commercial motives, as long as the particular use of the copyrighted material offered some
benefit to the public, the court found fair use provided a defense to copyright infringement. Id.
at 307.
91. 618 F.2d at 978.
92. But see Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950) (copyright
infringement established because the second writer did not do her own independent research
when she copied the first biographer's translations of Hans Christian Andersen's work).
93. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981).
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part of the public domain available to every person."94 This enables an
open exchange of facts.
3. Life Stories are Distinguishable
Life story facts seem distinguishable from those available through
the public domain. These facts are not discoverable per se, but the sub-
ject's life as it unfolds. Even though the subject is unable to copyright
her life story before she has committed it to some form of tangible ex-
pression, the subject still expends effort in living it. In this respect, the
subject could argue that the creation of her life story involves labor
unique to her efforts. Any unauthorized appropriation of her life story
may then be likened to unfair business competition. In International
News Service v. Associated Press,95 the news service was faulted for dis-
tributing news it took from AP bulletins. This was viewed by the Court
as an appropriation of AP's business goods, notwithstanding the fact that
these goods were uncopyrightable news facts. The Court refused to sever
the harmful finding of INS's distribution of AP's news from the efforts
expended by AP in the collection. Although the public has an interest in
encouraging efficient industries, the Court said that "the public interest
can never be promoted by encouraging unfair, inequitable or dishonora-
ble practices." '96
The Supreme Court's fear, that without protection from unfair com-
petition, industry would be destroyed, could perhaps be expanded to
protect the subject from unfair competition. Though the threat of de-
struction of industry may not transfer as clearly to the arena of sus-
taining a life story subject, if copyright law is supposed to be rewarding
writers with protection, it could be argued that copyright law thereby
recognizes the industry within the writer. Extending this analogy be-
yond the granting of a copyright to recognize that even the mere living of
the life story incurs labor suggests that the subject should be given a
chance to decide if she wants to market her story herself, before others
jump to produce a movie or write a book about her.
Of course, the public domain argument is a valid one. Some subjects
might never allow their life stories to be produced. There is also a strong
interest in the free exchange of information. What is troubling, however,
is the practice of seizing life stories for movies. The producers may pur-
port to be exercising the freedom of creative entertainment, yet this does
not ethically lead to precluding the subject's ability to market her story
or to assist in fostering an accurate portrayal.
94. Id. at 1369. See also M. NIMMER, supra note 82 § 2.03[E], at 2-34.
95. 248 U.S. 215, 226 (1918).
96. Id.
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Nevertheless, if a subject wishes to pursue a claim of copyright in-
fringement, she must be able to prove both copyright ownership accord-
ing to the terms of the statute and that the alleged infringer copied her
work. Copying can be proved by demonstrating access to the copy-
righted material along with a showing of substantial similarity between
the copyrighted material and the defendant's work.97 The showing of
substantial similarity is necessary to negate the defendant's inevitable de-
fense of independent creation.98 The defendant will claim independent
creation to defeat the plaintiff's claim that the defendant copied the ar-
rangement.99 To prove infringement, the subject may offer into evidence
the defendant's scripts so that they may be compared to the subject's
copyrighted work. The ultimate test of infringement, however, lies with
the defendant's finished product-the film."°°
B. The Fair Use Defense to a Claim of Copyright Infringement
The interest in disseminating information supports the producer's
argument of "fair use" access to the subject's life story. 01 Fair use cir-
cumvents any copyright protection by stating that reproductions of copy-
righted material may be made for basic information such as news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research. The four factors consid-
ered in determining if a fair use is being employed are listed as follows:
1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether the pur-
pose is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. 102
1. The Purpose of Fair Use
The doctrine of fair use seeks to promote educational and creative
progress, although not in the same manner as copyright law. Fair use
97. Miller, 650 F.2d at 1375 (citing M. NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01 [B],
at 13-7 (1980)).
98. Regarding similarity between the subject's life story in copyrighted material and a
producer's film, the defendant might cite Dorsey v. Old Surety Life Ins. Co., 98 F.2d 872, 873
(10th Cir. 1938) (quoting Affiliated Enter., Inc. v. Gruber, 86 F.2d 958, 961 (1st Cir. 1936)
("[o]ne work does not violate the copyright in another simply because there is a similarity
between the two if the similarity results from the fact that both works deal with the same
subject or have the same common source.")).
99. Miller, 650 F.2d at 1375.
100. Id.
101. The Copyright Act of 1976 presents the doctrine of fair use in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
102. Id.
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aids progress by removing the need for repetitive research once facts have
been uncovered. Despite broadened access to information provided by
fair use, the courts do not want the fair use doctrine to become a license
for corporate theft,103 especially when an individual's life story is at
stake. For example, in Harper & Row Publishing, Inc. v. Nation Enter-
prises,1°" the defendant's affirmative defense of fair use failed against the
plaintiff's copyright infringement claim. The defendant published verba-
tim excerpts from the plaintiff's authorized but unpublished biography of
President Ford. The defendant claimed that, since Ford was a public
figure, "the public's interest in learning [information about Ford] as fast
as possible outweigh[ed] the right of the author to control its first publi-
cation." 05 The Court disagreed and found this argument contrary to the
fundamental basis of copyright protection.l06
2 Substantiality of the Fair Use Claim
Justice Story's 1841 opinion in Folsom v. Marsh 107 suggested that
the fair use factors needed to be applied on an equitable case-by-case
basis. Folsom concerned Jared Sparks, the man authorized by President
Washington to incorporate his public and private letters into the Presi-
dent's official biography. The Reverend Charles Upham published his
own account of Washington's life using the letters entrusted to Sparks.
Though Upham took only 4.5 percent of Sparks' work, Justice Story de-
cided that Upham's failure to apply his own intellectual labor, combined
with his taking of the most interesting parts of the Sparks' biography,
constituted an infringement. 1 8 Justice Story established that a defend-
ant could not cite public benefit as a blanket justification for appropriat-
ing another's work. Rather, determination must be made as to whether
the defendant used the plaintiff's work primarily to review and criticize
it, or whether the defendant made a studied evasion of the plaintiff's
exact work through only slight omissions and formal differences. The
former is fair use, the latter is copyright infringement." °
103. W. F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 120 (1985) (quoting
Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d
Cir. 1980)).
104. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
105. Id. at 556.
106. Id.
107. 9 F. Cas. 342, 348-49 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901); see W.F. PARTY, supra note
103, at 19-20, 109.
108. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348-49.
109. W. F. PATRY, supra note 103, at 20.
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3. The Nature of the Copied Work
The more recently decided Salinger v. Random House, Inc. 110 and
New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co. " further narrow the
scope of fair use by establishing that personal letters do not necessarily
qualify for fair use. Harper & Row, Salinger, and New Era suggest that
notwithstanding the entertainment value of information about a well-
known person, fair use cannot be relied upon as a battle cry by people
seeking to exploit subjects' lives. These cases illustrate the advisability of
documenting one's life story in a tangible form and then registering it at
the copyright office in order to combat any possible future fair use
arguments.
If the subject does not document her life in a copyrighted form, she
may still be able to thwart a producer's appropriation of her life story by
analogizing to the above line of cases. Justice O'Connor has proposed
that the unpublished nature of writings may negate a defense of fair
use." 2 Extending this reasoning to a subject's unpublished accounts of
her life, a subject may successfully tegate the producer's claim of fair
use. The case-by-case determination of fair use, however, leaves the
soundness of this argument questionable. Courts may categorize Harper
& Row, Salinger, and New Era as pure copyright infringement cases,
rather than extend this reasoning by implication to a subject's right to
her life story.
The subject may face another stumbling block in a fight against fair
use. In Rosemont Enterprises,"3 the Second Circuit permitted a fair use
of Howard Hughes' copyrighted biography on the premise that people
may use one another's research to further public knowledge. In his book,
The Fair Use Privilege in Copyright Law," 4 copyright attorney William
Patry criticizes this application of fair use. He proposes that Folsom v.
Marsh stands for the idea that a major participant in a historical event
may prevent others from appropriating her interpretation of that
event. "5 This would clearly protect a subject's right to her life story
from claims of fair use. According to Narell v. Freeman,"6 which settled
a dispute concerning two books about San Francisco's Jewish commu-
nity, "[t]he scope of permissible fair use is greater with an informational
110. 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989).
111. 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987); see Park, The Chilling Effect of Overprotecting Factual
Narrative Works, 11 HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J. 75 (1988).
112. Goldberg & Bernstein, Fair Use-the Biographer's Bane, N.Y.L.J., May 19, 1989, at 3,
col. 1.
113. Rosement Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
114. W.F. PATRY, supra note 103, at 84.
115. Id.
116. 872 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1989).
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work than a creative work."" 7 Thus, if a producer states the thrust of a
movie is informational, then this reasoning would indicate a fair use ar-
gument would succeed. Yet, even if the producer admits the main pur-
pose of a movie is to entertain, the depiction of the subject may be
constitutionally protected through freedom of expression. 1
4. "Entertaining Uses" of Copyrighted Material
The recently decided Second Circuit case of New Era Publications,
Int'l v. Carol Publishing Group 1 9 strikes a strong blow against merely
entertaining fair uses. In an infringement claim brought by New Era
against yet another publisher for using L. Ron Hubbard's copyrighted
material, the court found for New Era. The court decided that the de-
fendants were incorporating Hubbard's work as transitional elements
within the biography, rather than as items subjected to scholarly criti-
ques.12 In accordance with a case-by-case inquiry into the circum-
stances surrounding a defense of fair use, the judge found that the
defendants misappropriated Hubbard's writings. This misappropriation
harmed New Era's independent decision of whether to even publish these
writings, since selective suppression was no longer a choice. The court's
rationale suggested that if a subject can persuade the court that the pro-
ducers are misappropriating her life story for entertainment value only,
and not for any of the fair use reasons suggested in the statute, then she
may be able to obtain an injunction similar to the one awarded to New
Era.
5. Economic Effect as a Fair Use Factor
Notwithstanding the producer's possible defense of freedom of ex-
pression, the subject may pursue the fourth fair use factor: the economic
derogation of the value of the life story. This argument proposes that a
movie producer's unauthorized depiction of a life story effectively dimin-
ishes the uniqueness of the story and prevents the subject from later max-
imizing her selling price, should she decide to exploit the story herself.
Whether the producer's unauthorized use of the life story will im-
pinge on the future market potential of anything the subject decides to
create as her own expression of her life story is an issue of fact for a jury,
117. Id. at 914.
118. See Note, supra note 5, at 276 n. 126, citing Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25
Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979).
119. 729 F. Supp. 992 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). This is a separate lawsuit from the earlier-cited
New Era case, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987). Although the use of L. Ron Hubbard's copyrighted
writings is again at issue, the defendants are a different publishing company and biographer.
120. Id. at 997.
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according to Meeropol v. Nizer. 121 Here, the Second Circuit disagreed
with a lower court's blanket approval of a fair use defense. Nizer had
incorporated within his book The Implosion Conspiracy letters written by
Ethel and Julius Rosenberg. The Rosenbergs' children protested Nizer's
use of these letters. This decision held that as long as the letters' effect on
the future market for Rosenberg history was unknown, a dispute existed
which only a trier of fact could determine in light of all the relevant
facts. 122
IV
Right of Privacy
A. What the Subject Must Prove
The right of privacy developed from a common law belief in incor-
poreal rights in intangible property, such as ideas, which protected one's
personality. It is sometimes referred to as the "right to be let alone."' 1 23
Prosser outlined four types of the invasion of privacy tort: "1) Intrusion
upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude... 2) Public disclosure of em-
barrassing private facts ... 3) Publicity which places the plaintiff in a
false light in the public eye [and] 4) Appropriation, for the defendant's
advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness."124 The third type is more
commonly referred to as false-light invasion of privacy and is the type
implicated in life story rights controversies.
The "right to be let alone" is frequently ignored or qualified when a
public interest exists in the dissemination of information about a particu-
lar topic, which necessarily includes real people. A subject may still re-
cover damages, however, if another's publication or broadcast of her life
story supports a false-light cause of action. According to the Second Re-
statement of Torts, the subject whose persona has been placed in public
view without her permission may have a cause of action against the pur-
veyor if it can be proved by using a reasonable person standard to show
that the portrayal is highly offensive, and that the publication was made
with knowledge of or reckless disregard as to its falsity.1 25 Before con-
fronting these hurdles in an invasion of privacy suit, the life story subject
must first grapple with the concepts of newsworthiness, accuracy, and
offensiveness.
121. 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977).
122. Id. at 1070.
123. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890).
124. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977). For an example of the Supreme
Court's application of this test, see Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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B. The Concept of Newsworthiness
A newsworthy story is one which legitimately falls within the pub-
lic's interest and is therefore subject to a producer's fair use defense.' 26
The courts make a distinction between stories which are legitimately
newsworthy and those which are fictionalizations of an event or adver-
tisements in disguise. 127 The commercial exploitation of the subject's
story through a magazine article or telecast may or may not factor into
this determination. 128
The 1913 New York case of Binns v. Vitagraph 129 established that a
cause of action may exist when a person's name or likeness is used with-
out permission in a fictional production. Binns, who had rescued cap-
sized boat passengers by telegraphing for help, objected to the manner in
which Vitagraph depicted him. Years later, in California, another man
who was dissatisfied with the manner in which he was portrayed without
his consent sued a television network in Strickler v. National Broadcast-
ing Co.'30 There, a motion to dismiss was denied, and the plaintiff, a
pilot, was able to proceed on his claim against the network for what he
stated was a humiliating and false portrayal of his rescue of downed air-
line passengers. '3" The court held that the alleged offensiveness of the
publication was a question of fact.' a2 Even before Strickler, a New York
district court refused to find as a matter of law that a defendant's maga-
zine articles were legitimate news when the plaintiff's claimed story had
been fictionalized. 13  In the case, Garner v. Triangle Publications, the
magazine articles characterized the plaintiffs as murderers and adulter-
ers. '34 The article was published after the subjects' convictions of mur-
der, but before their convictions were overturned. The court apparently
hoped to avoid granting free rein to exploit other people's lives under the
126. J. Thomas McCarthy describes newsworthy as a "first amendment defense to the un-
permitted use of identity in media 'news' usage [which] requires that there be a reasonable
relationship between the plaintiff's identity and the subject of the story." J. MCCARTHY, THE
RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY 8-50 (1989).
127. Id. at 8-51.
128. Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw. U.L.
REV. 553, 590 (1960); Lazar, Towards a Right of Biography: Controlling Commercial Exploita-
tion of Personal History, 2 HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J. 489 (1980). For a focus on celebrities,
see Katz, Unauthorized Biographies and Other "Books of Revelations": A Celebrity's Legal Re-
course to a Truthful Public Disclosure, 36 UCLA L. REV. 815 (1988).
129. 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913). See also supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
130. 167 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
131. Id at 70.
132. Id. (citing Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 229, 253 P.2d 441, 446
(1953)).
133. Garner v. Triangle Publications, 97 F. Supp. 546, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
134. Id. 547.
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cloak of dissemination of information. 135 Thus, it should be recognized
that mere newsworthiness does not grant authors licenses to write novels
or fictionalize life stories without regard to possible privacy suits.' 36
Despite these decisions, courts often give more weight to the public's
right to be informed than to the individual's right to privacy when con-
sidering the genre of docudramas. 137 This balancing may lead to the sub-
ject becoming a prisoner of her former prominent public figure status. In
Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp. ,'13 a reclusive adult who had once been a
child prodigy unsuccessfully sued a New York magazine for invasion of
privacy. The magazine published an unauthorized biographical sketch
and cartoon of the plaintiff. The Second Circuit decided that, since a
continuing public interest existed in this person's life, the magazine's
truthful sketch was not actionable. Though the court recognized the
need to scrutinize a publication for revelations "so intimate and so un-
warranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage the community's
notion of decency,"' 139 it refused to bar an account which fell within the
scope of what the community considered acceptable. Following this
standard, a celebrity may find it especially difficult to prevent production
of a docudrama of her life. The producer may claim that the docudrama
is composed of facts within the public domain, which are not within
copyright protection, and fictional dialogues, which are within first
amendment protection. The actress Elizabeth Taylor faced such a prob-
lem when she tried to enjoin a production of her life story."4 When a
"private" figure' 4 ' protests a similar depiction, the producer's argument
that the facts are within the public domain may not carry as much
weight, especially if the notoriety is not the result of the subject's own
exploitation.
Binns v. Vitagraph 142 relied on New York's privacy statutes 143 and
established that a person may have a cause of action when his name or
likeness is used in a fictional production without permission.' 44 Yet, a
subject's right of privacy is limited when her actions naturally become
part of a televised spectacle. This was the case in Gautier v. Pro-Foot-
135. Id.
136. Gordon, supra note 128, at 590-91.
137. Pilgrim, supra note 3, at 27.
138. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
139. Id. at 809.
140. See Note, supra note 5, at 281-82.
141. A "private" figure is used here to describe someone who does not hold public office
and has not actively sought public attention prior to the events popularizing her life story.
142. 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913).
143. 210 N.Y. at 54-55, 103 N.E. at 1109.
144. Pilgrim, supra note 3, at 22-23.
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ball," in which a person's half-time act was televised without his con-
sent during a football game." 6 However, if the court determines that a
publication is primarily informative or educational, statutes such as New
York's Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51 147 are not helpful. Such was
the case in Koussevitsky v. Allen, Towne & Heath, Inc. ," where a promi-
nent symphony conductor was unable to prevent the publication of his
biography, because the defendants were able to prove that his life story
possessed educational value.
In contrast to Koussevitsky, sections 50 and 51 of the New York
Civil Rights Law were found applicable to a famous southpaw in Spahn
v. Julian Messner, Inc. 9 Although the pitcher was a popular figure, a
factor which usually precludes most privacy claims, Warren Spahn was
able to defend the sanctity of his personality outside his life in profes-
sional baseball. The New York court agreed that the defendant's unau-
thorized account of Spahn's private life did not serve any public interest,
because it lacked factual reporting. Thus, a subject's public personality
does not necessarily preclude a suit to maintain the privacy of her per-
sonal life, especially if the producer misrepresents facts about her life.
C. Accuracy and False-Light Privacy
What saved the publisher in Sidis from violating sections 50 and 51
of the New York Civil Rights Laws was the absence of embellishment in
the biographical sketch. 150 The Second Circuit indicated that if public
interest exists in the subject matter, the degree of fictionalization affects
whether a claim of invasion of privacy will succeed.
As discussed earlier, once a subject's life story is in the public do-
main, it is difficult to prevent others from using the story in the name of
public interest. As Strickler pointed out, a cause of action may be sup-
ported by inaccurate dramatization. Prosser stated that the plaintiff
must show a knowing or reckless disregard for falsity."'5 A subject may
therefore strengthen a claim against a producer's depictions of her life if
she can show that she was not interviewed or consulted by the movie
makers.152
145. 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952).
146. Id
147. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1989).
148. 188 Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779, aff'd, 272 A.D. 759, 69 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1947).
149. 18 N.Y. 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.2d 877 (1966).
150. Sidis v. F-R Publications Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 810 (2d Cir. 1940).
151. Prosser, supra note 124, at 383.
152. See Cantrell v. Forest Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (knowing or reckless false-
hoods found because the newspaper had not really interviewed person); Walter Fox Tree v.
Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc., 398 Mass. 845, 501 N.E.2d 519 (1986) (no finding of
false-light invasion of privacy since writer's observations were based on an actual interview).
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In order to dampen the subject's potentially damaging fictionaliza-
tion claim, the producer will necessarily want to remain as true to the
facts as possible. In all likelihood, a recognizable subject has been cho-
sen, which makes it easier for the subject to point out differences between
her life and the movie.15 a If the movie sticks too closely to the facts,
however, it might be dull, generating low ratings. Courts therefore allow
dramatic devices such as "telescoping" events in order to compress the
time element, a practice upheld in the making of the movie Missing.'54
Leeway is also given by the courts for reconstructing conversations or
events needed to move the story along, a practice called "scenes a
faire."' 55
As a practical matter, very few privacy claims have been decided
outside of defamation, and conflicting state statutes and court decisions
provide the movie industry with little guidance as to the extent a sub-
ject's life story may be used without permission. The foundation for legal
advice to producers is based on custom, reality, and fear of defamation
lawsuits, in addition to network standards and carrier insurance guide-
lines.156 Some movie studios and television networks place the burden of
accuracy and fair representation on their producers in an effort to ward
off false-light or defamation lawsuits. The American Broadcasting Com-
pany (ABC), for instance, states in its guidelines that a person's known
attitudes and behavior patterns should be followed closely enough to
avoid contradicting known facts. 157 Specific representations must be ac-
counted for, and releases from any prominently portrayed individuals are
advised.' 58 The Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) admonishes its
producers against "materially alter[ing] or distort[ing] the historical rec-
ord,"' 5 9 while the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) requires a
clear disclosure that the events portrayed are dramatizations. ' 60
If producers choose not to pursue releases or verifications, then it is
best to avoid using the subject's real name, unless the portrayal is in-
tended to be factual.' 6' In the 1950s, NBC produced a series called The
Big Story, which featured "fictionalized dramatizations"' 162 of reporters.
The names of the non-reporters in these stories were changed and inci-
153. Golden, supra note 1, at 5, col. 4.
154. Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 580 F. Supp. 1082 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Berreby, Lawsuit Brews
over Missing, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 5, 1982, at 7, col. 1.
155. Walker v. Time-Life Films, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 430, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
156. Golden, supra note 1, at 5, col. 4.
157. AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANY GUIDELINES, supra note 39, at 4.
158. Id. at 1.
159. Pilgrim, supra note 3, at 32.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 27.
162. Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955).
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dents fictionalized for dramatic effect. In one such story, a Mr. Bernstein
had come within one day of execution for a murder he had not commit-
ted when reporter Martha Sayer was able to convince others of his inno-
cence. Sayer's life-saving reporting occurred in 1940, and until NBC's
depiction of his story in 1952, Mr. Bernstein had voluntarily dropped out
of the public eye. The court ruled that Bernstein did not have a defama-
tion action against NBC because, notwithstanding the similarity in looks
and speech between the character and himself, the story did not identify
him by name. Some critics of the case surmise that Bernstein's large
request for punitive damages may have been the decisive factor against
him. 163
Should courts analogize to a California invasion of privacy by publi-
cation case, Bindrim v. Mitchell, 4 the production of a life story movie
today would be particularly risky, especially without consulting those
portrayed. Bindrim was a psychologist who successfully proved that
Mitchell had defamed him in her novel. Although the author did not use
Bindrim's name, she failed to hide his identity through fictionalization.
Bindrim was able to prove the defamation claim based on the fact that
the author had some contact with him, and the fact that a reasonable
observer would think the author's psychologist character was
Bindrim. 161
As mentioned in Springer v. Viking Press,166 even if the author had
created more dissimilarities between her character and Bindrim, she
might still have been liable, because the dissimilarities themselves may
have provided the basis for the defamation claim. The safest route for
producers is to obtain releases from the subjects, which many producers
do with moderate compensation. This compensation may seem particu-
larly modest when compared with the revenues the studio stands to gen-
erate if the movie is aired on network television. Securing a price more
reflective of the value of the subject's life story is one of the duties en-
tertainment lawyers try to fulfill when negotiating a deal. Due to the
nuances of the entertainment industry and the premium placed on tim-
ing, entertainment lawyers maintain that they are best able to protect
subjects' financial interests in promoting life stories. 1 67
163. Id. at 820; Pilgrim, supra note 3, at 25-26.
164. 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1979).
165. Id. at 78, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
166. 60 N.Y.2d 916, 458 N.E.2d 1256, 470 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1983). In Springer, the court
found that the dissimilarities were too great to think the writer's ex-girlfriend was recogniza-
ble. See generally Baer, supra note 17.
167. Golden, supra note 1, at 19, col. 5.
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D. The Offensiveness Standard
The landmark case Time, Inc. v. Hill 6 8 places first amendment con-
cerns for free speech above privacy rights, unless the plaintiff can prove a
careless disregard for truth. Yet, even with a showing of offensiveness,
this is difficult to do. The courts have established a number of hoops the
subject must jump through before an invasion of privacy will be found.
This was a problem in Cohn v. National Broadcasting Co., 169 in which the
plaintiffs contended that the network's film Tail Gunner Joe, broadcast in
1977, placed them in public ridicule and injured their reputations. The
court maintained that the plaintiffs had not met the Gertz v. Welch 7o
standard of proving actual malice, since the matters depicted in the film
were of public interest, notwithstanding the plaintiffs' return to private
life.' 71
An alternative method of arguing offensiveness is provided by Kelly
v. Loew's, Inc. 172 Here, a naval officer was pressured by the Navy into
signing a release to a book publisher for an account of his World War II
experiences. The officer complained that the movie, which developed
from the book, libeled him and other officers through its embellishments
of the fighters' activities. The movie was fairly accurate when taken as a
whole, yet the court decided that the "greater the truth, the greater the
libel,"17 3 and found for the plaintiffs. The court decided that the sub-
jects' professional interest in their reputations deserved recognition.
Though understanding the need for professionals to be somewhat thick-
skinned when it comes to misrepresentations about them, the district
court stated that the commander had agreed to sacrifice his privacy, not
his reputation, to the producers.' 74 The question of offensiveness was
framed not as whether the audience knew the subject personally, but
whether they knew his reputation. 175 This may be one avenue for a sub-
ject to pursue in a defamation or invasion of privacy claim: ask the court
to consider the effect on the subject's reputation within a respectable,
substantial part of the community where the statement is made.' 76
The theory of offensiveness to a community's standards of good
morals provided the winning argument in the groundbreaking California
168. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
169. 67 A.D.2d 140, 414 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1st Dept. 1979).
170. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
171. Id.
172. 76 F. Supp. 473 (D. Mass. 1948).
173. Id. at 487.
174. Id. at 489.
175. Id. at 485.
176. Id. at 486.
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case, Melvin v. Reid.177 California does not recognize an explicit right to
privacy. Rather, the right to be let alone is based on the state's constitu-
tional right to the pursuit of happiness. In Melvin v. Reid, a housewife
sued the makers of the movie The Red Kimono, which recreated her past
life as a prostitute. The California court espoused the desirability of en-
couraging citizens to rehabilitate themselves and lead a moral life. Since
the production of The Red Kimono frustrated the subject's ability to pur-
sue a moral and happy life, the court found for the plaintiff.
This novel construction of the right to be let alone surfaced again in
Mau v. Grande Oil, Inc. 78 In this case, a chauffeur successfully sued the
producers of a Calling All Cars radio episode for the unauthorized use of
his name. The chauffeur claimed that the episode caused him to relive
the horrible memory of being held up and shot.' 79 The district court
held that Mau was entitled to be let alone, reaffirming the Melvin
decision.
Preventing the exposure of unpleasant experiences by an offensive
movie is difficult, since courts prefer not to grant preliminary injunctions,
due to the possibility of trampling first amendment principles. 180 Before
evaluating the injury which will be wrought on the respective parties by
its decision, a court will routinely consider whether the plaintiff comes to
trial with "clean hands," and whether the parties are in competition with
each other.' Thus, the subject should recognize that any activity be-
tween her and producers will be carefully scrutinized by the court, sug-
gesting a need to have counsel present during any negotiations.
V
Right of Publicity
Since a right of privacy may be difficult to sustain once a subject's
story has attracted enough notoriety to interest movie producers, the
subject's strongest argument to prevent unauthorized exploitation of her
life story seems to be the right to publicity. The law of trade names or
unfair competition and misappropriation comprise the bases for the de-
veloping right of publicity.
177. 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
178. 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
179. Id. at 846.
180. See Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 1966) (cit-
ing Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, 49 Misc. 2d 726, 268 N.Y.S.2d 531, 534 (Sup. Ct.
1957)).
181. Id. at 310.
1990]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
A. Unfair Competition
The test for unfair competition is substantial similarity between the
plaintiff's and defendant's products such that an observer could confuse
the source of the products. The criteria for the test can be found in Sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act.1 8 2 It states that:
Any person who shall ... use in connection with any goods... false
description or representation.., falsely to describe or represent same
... shall be liable to a civil action by ... any person who believes that
he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description
or representation. 1 8
3
The test for false designation consists of a two-part inquiry: First, is the
defendant misrepresenting a source which the public identifies with the
plaintiff? And second, is the defendant passing off his production as the
plaintiff's, creating public confusion?
In Walker v. Time-Life Films, Inc.,'8 4 the police officer who au-
thored Fort Apache tried to convince a New York court that the defend-
ant's movie about a Bronx police beat was so similar to his novel that
unfair competition was taking place. The court, however, found that the
newsworthiness of certain events portrayed, combined with the allowable
"scenes a faire" used to help propel the plot, protected Time Life from
facing an unfair competition charge.
In general, a false designation of origin claim is appropriate to sus-
tain an unfair competition claim, should a movie producer create a
docudrama about the subject, since it is likely the public will assume the
subject was involved. As Walker illustrates, the finding of a right of pub-
licity depends on the plaintiff's ability to prove that his story is his alone
to market, notwithstanding the producer's defense of fair use. Thus,
rather than argue false designation of origin, it may be more advisable to
argue a misappropriation of property rights in one's name.
B. Misappropriation of the Subject's Property Right
The claim of misappropriation, unlike unfair competition, does not
require any substantial similarity between finished products. Misappro-
priation focuses instead on the taking of a property right. Recognition of
a property right in one's good name, reputation, and goodwill was real-
ized at least as early as 1938, in Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Univer-
sal Pictures Co. 15 Universal presented footage of hockey games
supposedly taking place in Madison Square Garden, but actually played
182. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
183. Id.
184. 615 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
185. 255 A.D.2d 459, 7 N.Y.S.2d 845 (lst Dept. 1938).
[Vol. 12:627
LIFE STORY RIGHTS
elsewhere. Even earlier, a New York court defined the right of publicity
in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum."8 6 Haelan con-
tracted with a baseball player for exclusive use of the player's name. The
baseball player subsequently allowed Topps to use his photo in connec-
tion with its gum, overlapping a term of the Haelan contract.
Though Topps argued that the purpose of the Haelan contract was
merely to shield Haelan from any invasion of privacy claims by the base-
ball player, the Second Circuit reasoned that:
[A] man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the
right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture, and that
such a grant may validly be made "in gross," i.e., without an accompa-
nying transfer of a business or of anything else.... This right might be
called a "right of publicity."' 187
The previous grant of publicity rights to Haelan made the subsequent
one to Topps invalid. Haelen therefore highlights the necessity of paying
careful attention to all agreements made between a subject and producer,
lest the subject contract away more than she realizes. Such is the case
with Christine Costner Sizemore, who faces the problem of the ambiguity
of her contract with Twentieth Century-Fox in her lawsuit against the
studio. 18 8
1. Elements of a Right of Publicity Cause of Action
The theories underlying the right of publicity resemble those of
copyright protection. By recognizing a right of publicity, unjust enrich-
ment can be thwarted, individual creativity can be better encouraged,
and the economic value of one's identity can be preserved along the lines
of property rights, which is beneficial in protecting contractual interests
of licensees. I 9 When suing on a right of publicity theory for the uncon-
sented use of a person's likeness, one must prove: 1) that she validly owns
rights to the likeness, either because it is her own identity, or because she
has an exclusive license to it; and 2) that the defendant has infringed
upon this right by using the likeness without permission in an identifiable
manner, likely to cause damage to the commercial value of the iden-
tity.' 90 The subject must also investigate her particular jurisdiction's
statutes to determine what else must be proven.
Both California and New York have statutes which protect the use
of a person's likeness for exploitation. California Civil Code Section
186. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1955).
187. Id. at 868.
188. Rudell, supra note 1.
189. For a good discussion regarding the right of publicity, see Note, supra note 5. For a
more thorough handling of the complexities surrounding the right of publicity and privacy, see
generally J. MCCARTHY, supra note 126.
190. J. MCCARTHY, supra note 126, at 3-3.
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3344 proscribes the knowing use of another's "name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness, in any manner... for purposes of advertising or
selling, or soliciting purchases... without such person's prior consent
S., 191 One of the hoops the subject must jump through in applying this
statute is convincing the court that, by the nature of the advertising reve-
nues created, television shows themselves are advertising media.
New York's Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51 are similar to Cali-
fornia's misappropriation statute. In New York, two requirements must
be met in order to sustain an infringement of a right of publicity cause of
action. 192 First, there must be a showing of an unauthorized commercial
use of one's name or picture. Second, there must be a failure by the
defendant to obtain the subject's written consent for the use. 193 The sub-
ject must remember, though, that if her story is deemed newsworthy, first
amendment concerns may preclude her from any recovery.
2. Analogy to Property Law
In Uhlaender v. Hendrickson,94 a baseball player was able to pre-
vent the defendant from using his name and accomplishments. The court
agreed with the plaintiff's claim of misappropriation, due to the defend-
ant's use of the player's achievements for commercial profit. The
Uhlaender court stated, "plaintiff's name and likeness belong to [him]
... As such they are property. They are things of value."' 9 5 The court
further stated that a "person has a right to enjoy the fruits of his own
industry free from unjustified interference. "196 Uhlaender pointed out
that in a misappropriation suit over the use of one's name, injury to feel-
ings and reputation are secondary, while potential injury to commercial
value is primary. 197
Because the court found the plaintiff's name and likeness to be prop-
erty, it likened the theory of misappropriation of someone's name to that
of trespass. 198 The property aspect is derived from the years of labor
invested into creating an "identity, embodied in his name, likeness, statis-
tics and other personal characteristics."' 99 The district court even distin-
guished a future right of publicity, saying that a lack of present
191. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344 (West 1989).
192. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
193. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1990); Note, supra note 5, at 267.
194. 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970).
195. Id. at 1280-81 (citing Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc., 97 N.J. Super. 327, 331, 235 A.2d
62, 76 (1967)).
196. Id. at 1282.
197. Id. at 1280.
198. Id. at 1281.
199. Id. at 1282.
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capitalization upon one's name in the market "should not be justification
for others to do so because of the void. They may desire to do it
later.,200
Based on the commercial exploitation aspects of the decision,
Uhlaender suggests that producers who make movies about people
should seriously consider obtaining releases, since there may be a chance
that the subject will argue in the future that the producer's movie about
her injured her ability to exploit her name herself. Of course, the pro-
ducer may well respond that his movie fanned the enthusiasm for any
marketing venture the plaintiff may decide to pursue, °1 making the
question of the value in the plaintiff's name itself an issue.
3. The Subject's Right of Commerical Exploitation
Generally, the cases suggest that if a right of publicity can be estab-
lished, the court will grant the subject exclusive rights in controlling the
commercial value of her name and likeness, and will enable her to pre-
vent others from exploiting them without permission.20 2 One question
which the subject must honestly ask herself is whether her story is news-
worthy and one of legitimate public interest. If it is, then her right to
publicity may be overridden by fair use and first amendment concerns.20 3
Yet, even a televised newsreport of the subject's activities will not neces-
sarily destroy the subject's claim to a right of publicity, as demonstrated
by the only Supreme Court decision in this area of the law, Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. 21 In this case, the plaintiff com-
plained of a news station's broadcast of his human cannonball act with-
out his permission. Since Zacchini earned his living from admission fees
paid to see him shot through a cannon, the Supreme Court decided that
the plaintiff was exerting effort in promoting his identity, which the news
show had no right to appropriate.20 5
4. False Representations May Preclude Recovery
University of Notre Dame v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.2 6
throws another twist into establishing a right of publicity. Though the
200. Id.
201. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 980 n.7 (2d Cir. 1980).
202. Bi-Rite Enters. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
203. Examples of cases where no redeeming social function of informing society was found,
thus preventing a fair use affirmative defense by the defendant, are Estate of Presley v. Russen,
513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981) and Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
204. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
205. Id.
206. 22 A.D.2d 452, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301 (1st Dept. 1965).
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plaintiff was an institution and not a person, the New York court's deci-
sion to deny a misappropriation claim based on its findings that people
would know the defendant was making a false representation of the uni-
versity in its movie signifies a more serious concern for fair use over any
publicity rights in such circumstances. Thus, the subject may be pre-
cluded from recovery, if it is obvious that the defendant deliberately
made a false representation of the subject.
5. Identifiable Link Between Subject and Character
The key to presenting a right of publicity misappropriation claim is
establishing identifiability between the subject and the producer's charac-
ter. Past advertising cases, in which the plaintiff sought to enjoin the
defendant from using his name to endorse a product, examine whether
the plaintiff's persona is identified solely with him, and whether a likeli-
hood of confusion will result, should the defendant use that persona. In
Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.,2°7 a star athlete dubbed with the
nickname "Crazylegs" was allowed to protect his "property rights in the
publicity value of aspects of [his] identity."2 8 Drawing upon Prosser's
fourth privacy tort, appropriation of the plaintiff's name for the defend-
ant's advantage,2' the Wisconsin court agreed that Hirsch had a prop-
erty right in protecting his name and identity. Adding to the strength of
its decision, the court cited Mercury Record Prod., Inc. v. Economic Con-
sultants, Inc. :10 "It is a form of commercial immorality to 'reap where
another has sown.' "211
The Wisconsin Supreme Court remanded Hirsch to determine as a
question of fact whether the name "Crazylegs" was so closely associated
with the plaintiff, and whether the defendant's use of the name would be
likely to cause public confusion about Hirsch's sponsorship of the de-
fendant's goods. What is notable from a life story perspective is that the
court stated it was not necessary, as a matter of law, for Hirsch to
demonstrate his own use of his name to endorse products.2 12 In other
words, a subject may be able to argue that the producer's unauthorized
use of her life story damages her ability to exploit her experiences, even if
she is not currently doing so.
207. 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979).
208. Id. at 383, 387, 280 N.W.2d at 130, 133.
209. Prosser, supra note 124.
210. 90 Wis. 2d at 391-92, 280 N.W.2d at 135 (citing 64 Wis. 2d 163, 218 N.W.2d 705
(1974)).
211. Id. at 391, 280 N.W.2d at 135.
212. Id. at 399, 280 N.W.2d at 138.
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6. California Implies a Common Law Right to Identity
While Hirsch resembles a trade name case, the recently decided Cal-
ifornia case of Midler v. Ford Motor Co.2 3 relies upon the misappropria-
tion of Bette Midler's persona as it is expressed in her singing voice.
Since Midler refuses to do commercials, she could not argue that the
defendant's copying of her voice was unfair competition. Rather, she
claimed that Young and Rubicam, Ford Motor Company's advertising
company, misappropriated her voice by purposefully instructing one of
her backup singers to imitate her singing style in its commercial. Midler
could not invoke California Civil Code section 3344,214 since her voice
was not actually used but only imitated. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit
decided that the statute implies that a common law cause of action exists
when aspects of a person's identity are used without the person's con-
sent.2"' California's recognition of a property right even in a deceased
person's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness2" 6 further high-
lights California's recognition of common law rights in identity being
similar to property rights. Significantly, the Midler court stated that the
impersonation of Midler's voice was a pirating of her identity.21 7
VI
Conclusion
The logic of Midler should be applicable to life story subjects facing
producers who appropriate their stories for movies. Whether this Cali-
fornia case will spur moviemakers to negotiate with life story subjects
before embarking upon a project remains to be seen. Recently, a
Hollywood production company paid $100,000 for the story of two Flor-
ida girls who were accidentally swapped at birth. 8 The mix-up was
discovered when one of the ten-year-old girls died. Part of the money
will be used to set up a college fund for the surviving child.21 9 If produ-
cers are going to use life stories to make movies, this at least seems to be
a step towards recognizing the story's value to the subjects themselves.
When a person lives through an extraordinary event, making a
movie about the experience may not be the first thing on the person's
mind, though the recent proliferation of true-life movies-of-the-week
213. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
214. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1989).
215. 849 F.2d at 463.
216. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(b) (West 1989).
217. 849 F.2d at 463.
218. Baby-swap Incident to Become Movie, San Francisco Examiner, Feb. 18, 1990, at E4,
col. 5.
219. Id.
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might indicate otherwise. If a producer finds the story to be enough of
an attention-grabber, he will investigate options for basing a movie on the
life story. By the time the story reaches producers, it generally will have
traveled through common public channels such as the news, arguably
giving the story public domain status. Once in the public domain, the
subject's success in pursuing an invasion of privacy claim diminishes, un-
less she can support an action of false-light invasion of privacy.
Although a producer may doubt the necessity of obtaining privacy
releases from a life story subject, he may still be interested in offering her
adequate compensation and soliciting unique insights for the movie. The
life story subject should carefully contract with the producer to avoid
some of the problems discussed in this Note. Details regarding the exclu-
sivity of the producer's rights to the subject's story, the duration of these
rights, the period of the subject's life covered by the movie, the subject's
freedom to capitalize upon her experiences in media other than movies,
and the control the subject may exert over the final production all need
to be addressed.
Without a contract drafted with the assistance of attorneys savvy to
the intricacies of the entertainment industry, a subject upset by a movie
depicting her life has limited recourse. Life stories which are not ex-
pressed in any tangible form are outside the scope of copyright protec-
tion. The notoriety of the life story generally prevents most invasion of
privacy claims, unless the subject can craft her claim to reflect her juris-
diction's respect for the sanctity of personal affairs.220 Not all jurisdic-
tions recognize a right to publicity, but if Midler is an indication of a
trend toward recognizing the right of a person to prevent others from
appropriating her persona,22' then arguing misappropriation of her life
story would be the subject's next best claim to that of breach of contract
in seeking the compensation deserved when her life is the primary inspi-
ration for a movie.
220. This was the case in California in Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931),
but not the case in New York in Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d. Cir. 1940).
221. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988).
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